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The one important lesson that should be drawn from the last few weeks’ interaction and conflict between Israeliand Palestinian forces is that a new deal between Hamas and Israel is timely, possible and necessary to gradually move towards ending the conflict between them. To be sure, since any incident could trigger an outbreak of renewed violence, it is in the interest of both Israel and Hamas to build on the recent prisoner exchange and seek a new agreement that would ease the Israeli blockade and gradually end it. Similarly, Hamas would officially suspend violence and eventually renounce it as a means by which to achieve the Palestinians’ aspiration for statehood.
The two agreements that Hamas has reached recently through Egyptian mediation – the Palestinian reconciliation agreement in May with the Fatah movement and the prisoner swap agreement in October with Israel – offer an opportunity to provide the building blocks for improved relations between Israel and Hamas. The prisoner swap suggests that Hamas and Israel recognize each other’s unmitigated reality and prerogatives. Neither side could retrieve their captives through the use of force nor, as some Hamas members have suggested, that the prisoner’s exchange would allow for the exchange of more Palestinian prisoners in the future should Hamas succeed in capturing new Israeli soldiers.
These two agreements therefore imply that the positions of the two parties are actually much closer than they appear on the surface. Under the proposed deal Hamas would commit itself to the suspension of all violent activities against Israel emanating from Gaza. In return, Israel would, in phases, lift the blockade it has imposed on the Gaza Strip since 2006 and open all the Israel-Gaza crossings to allow the free flow of people and commodities in both directions.
There are those who can persuasively argue that it is unthinkable for Hamas to renounce the “armed struggle” on which it has built its legitimacy in the Palestinian territories. This argument, however, can be mitigated on several grounds. First, Hamas de facto adheres, even voluntarily, to the cease-fire and works aggressively against other radical groups in Gaza from firing rockets at Israel. Second, the prisoner exchange has shown that Hamas can extract concessions from Israel only through negotiations. Third, Hamas’ challenge is made more difficult as a result of the uprising in Syria which threatens the collapse of its base in that country, compelling Hamas to work much closer with the Egyptian authorities than ever before. More importantly, the proposed deal requires neither direct negotiations between Israel and Hamas nor formal recognition of Israel nor a surrendering of arms, but simply an official suspension of violence to give the non-violent approach a chance.
For Israel, some would certainly argue that the Netanyahu government would be disinterested in such a deal because it has, by and large, already secured a cease-fire. But this argument is myopic for a number of reasons. First, the blockade is degrading Israel’s moral international standing, increasing its isolation, and reinforcing the image of Israel as an indifferent and recluse state.
Second, removing the blockade would be gradual. Hamas’ commitment would be tested and monitored by Egyptians who have a vested interest in keeping the peace. It should be noted that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman in 2010 suggested disengaging entirely from Gaza including lifting the blockade and leaving Hamas to its own devices as long as it does not commit acts of violence against Israel.
Third, the new revelations made by the International Atomic and Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran is clearly advancing toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons represents an existential threat from the Israeli perspective and should also provide the Netanyahu government with the incentive to reach an understanding with the Palestinians. It would be in Israel’s best interest to focus on Iran and prevent the emergence of a new front in Gaza.
Finally, the gradual removal of the blockade would also provide a good start toward mending relations with Turkey, especially at a time when Turkey is playing an increasingly important role in dealing with the uprising in Syria, which has serious direct and indirect national security effects on Israel.
The third party that would enormously benefit from the agreement and whose contribution to it is indispensible is, of course, Egypt. The ruling military in Egypt would be interested in reaching an agreement between Israel and Hamas out of the concern that a renewed violent conflict would only complicate the domestic situation in Egypt and severely undermine its relations with both Israel and the United States. Egypt could not simply come to Hamas’ aid in case of a new Israeli incursion without risking these relations nor could it ignore the death of hundreds of Palestinians without public outcry.
Inherent in the proposed deal is the inclusion of phases that would engender trust in the mechanism and help Israel and Hamas maintain an ongoing dialogue, albeit indirectly, to develop the confidence needed to move to the next phase of any agreement they reach. As Hamas suspends violence, and the mutual cease-fire is reinforced, Israel would reciprocate by gradually easing the blockade, provided that the Egyptians would take verifiable and transparent measures to prevent weapons from being smuggled into Gaza. There should be no doubt that the United States and the Quartet, especially Russia, has a role to play in this agreement by signaling to Hamas that taking such a step would pave the way for providing finance for the reconstruction of Gaza to help the Palestinian population.
If conducted in good faith through the genuine interests of both parties, this deal would create a new dynamic that induces both Israel and Hamas to accept the inescapable reality of each other’s existence as people and neighbors.
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